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A GOLDEN GOAL
FOR SOUTH AFRICA
Security arrangements
for the 2010 FIFA
Soccer World Cup
The 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup has been a major talking point both locally and internationally, and many
concerns have been raised over South Africa’s ability to host such a major event. These concerns essentially
relate to infrastructural capacity and security. It goes without saying that South Africa is obliged to provide
high level security for participating teams and management as well as for the thousands of spectators who are
expected to flood South Africa for the duration of the event. This article takes a look at other high level events
that have been hosted in South Africa so as to get an idea of what is required and examines planned security
arrangements for the 2010 World Cup. 
The FIFA Soccer World Cup in 2010
1 will be a
month-long event taking place in June/July of
that year and will be decided by 64 matches
played in ten stadiums spread over nine South
African cities. During this time approximately
450,000 visitors are expected to visit this country,
while 3.3 million tickets will be sold for these
matches. South Africa, as the host country, is
obligated to ensure a high level of security for this
event, which includes the security of the teams, the
spectators, and their property, for the duration of the
event. At the same time ‘normal’ policing, i.e.
policing the public of South Africa, cannot be
neglected.
Media reports have questioned South Africa’s
readiness to present an event of this magnitude. In
addition to concerns about infrastructure and
transport, the high levels of serious and violent
crimes in particular have raised doubts about the
ability of the police to provide the required levels of
security. In the discussion that follows, attention will
be given to the 2010 crime and security situation, as
well as to the development potential of this event for
the South African police and for policing in general.
Crime overview
The crime situation in South Africa is serious and
dominates the domestic agendas of both
government and civil society as well as daily media
reports. There are also legitimate concerns that
levels of violence associated with crime in this
country are on the increase. The result is increased
fear of crime, and growing distrust in the police and
government in general to effectively deal with crime.
For example, in a victim survey done by the Institute
for Security Studies in 2003, 58% of respondents
indicated that they are afraid of walking alone in
their area after dark, compared to 25% in a 1998
survey. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the serious and
violent crimes that are our biggest cause for
concern. In an attempt to determine possible trends,
a comparison is provided for three financial years
since 1994/95. Unfortunately, the figures for car
Johan Burger, Institute for Security Studies
jburger@issafrica.org
hijackings are available only from 2001/02 (Table
2), as is the case with cash-in-transit robberies. In
the latter case the actual figures are given because,
although still serious, the numbers are too small to
determine a meaningful ratio per 100,000 of the
population.
According to the Annual Report of the South African
Police Service 2005/06 there are promising signs
over the last five years that crime is on the decrease.
Between 2004/05 and 2005/06 the listed serious
and violent crimes decreased as follows:
• Murder: 2,0%
• Attempted murder: 16,6%
• Rape: 1% 
• Robbery with aggravated circumstances: 6,2% 
• Common robbery (an element of violence, but 
without the use of weapons): 18,3%. 
Car hijackings, on the other hand, which decreased
by 10,1% in the previous financial year, increased
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by 2,6% in the last financial year (2005/06). Cash-
in-transit robberies increased by 74,1% and
robberies at shopping malls (not shown in the
tables) by 32%.
These decreases are indeed promising, but it must
be kept in mind that they are decreases from
extremely high levels and that it will take a long
time before these crimes reach the sort of levels that
will positively impact on public feelings of safety.
The murder rate, for example, decreased from 66,9
per 100,000 in 1994/95 to 39,5 in 2005/06, but is
still almost eight times the world average of 5,5 and
20 times higher than the British rate of just under
two per 100,000. In other words, if the current
reduction rate in murder is maintained, it will take
approximately another 15 years to reach the
international norm. The South African figure
becomes even more disturbing if one looks at the
real number of 18,528 people who were murdered
in one year, i.e. 50 murders per day.
Rape has remained at the same high level over the
last 11 years and shows no sign of decreasing to 
the extent that some of the other serious crimes
have done. In real terms, the figure of 117,1 per
100,000 in 2005/06 represents almost 55,000
rapes, i.e. 150 women raped every day in this
country. This is an alarming situation; especially in
view of the result of independent research that
shows that between 33–66% of rape cases are
never reported to the police. Rape is also not an
easy crime to police and happens mostly indoors in
areas outside the normal reach of police activities.
Recent research has shown that in 75% of rape
incidents the victim and perpetrator are known to
one another.
However, it is robbery, and the violence that goes
with it, that has the biggest psychological impact on
the ordinary person. Whether it is robbery at one’s
home, a hijacking, or robbery at places of
entertainment (e.g. shopping malls, restaurants, etc),
the indisputable fact is that people are afraid of
being robbed. If this situation is allowed to continue
and, even worse, allowed to further deteriorate, it
will create a psychosis of fear which, in turn, could
lead to irrational and even unlawful behaviour by
certain individuals and groups.
Table 1: Comparative figures for serious 
and violent crimes2
(rate per 100,000 of the population)
1994/95 1999/2000 2005/06  
Murder          66,9 52,5 39,5  
Attempted 
murder 69,1 65,4 43,9  
Rape 115,3 122,8 117,1  
Robbery 
(aggravated) 218,5 229,5 255,3  
Robbery 
(common) 84,2 173,5 159,4 
Table 2: Car hijackings and 
cash-in-transit robberies
2001/ 2002/ 2003/ 2004/ 2005/
02 03 04 05 06  
Hijackings 35,4 32,3 29,7 26,7 27,4
(rate per 
100,000) 
Cash-in- 238 374 192 220 383
transit 
robberies 
(number of 
incidents)       
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matches will be played in all nine provinces. The
security budget for the CWC was approximately
R91m, against FIFA’s safety and security budget
estimate of approximately $36m (more than R250m)
for 2010. 
The combined force deployed for the CWC totalled
approximately 4,600 members of the South African
Police Service, South African National Defence
Force, Metropolitan Police Services, various
emergency services and private security companies.
Given that the duration of the event should not have
a substantial influence on the number of
police/security personnel deployed, the total
number of personnel for the SWC will probably be
determined more by factors such as the larger
number of matches, the fact that matches will be
played in all nine provinces, and that much larger
crowds of supporters and spectators are expected at
the soccer matches. A rough estimate at this stage
places the number of police/security personnel at
double that of the CWC, i.e. approximately 10,000.
To the credit of the South African Police Service,
which led the security operation during 2003, no
serious incidents occurred during the entire event.
In fact, after the CWC a leading London financial
newspaper remarked that an amazing thing
happened during the Cricket World Cup in South
Africa: ”Nothing went wrong”. This is despite the
fact that crime rates were generally higher in
2003/04 than at any time before or since, even for
robbery. So why is there such widespread concern
that South Africa may not be able to provide
adequate security for the Soccer World Cup?
The security operation for 2010
At an ISS seminar, ‘Securing the 2010 Soccer World
Cup: Are we ready?’, in September 2006, the SAPS
was given the opportunity to allay fears that crime
may derail the World Cup and that South Africa will
not be ready to safeguard this event. Assistant
Commissioner Mathongwane, on behalf of the
police, gave an overview of the security plan for this
event, but was careful to avoid detail that may
compromise operational security. 
Based on Commissioner Mathongwane’s
presentation and the FIFA report of 4 May 2004, the
Unlike murder and attempted murder, robbery
(both aggravated and common) displays a different
trend. Whereas murder consistently decreased since
1994/95 (by approximately 40% over the last 11
years), robbery with aggravating circumstances
increased from 218,5 per 100,000 in 1994/95, to
288,1 in 2003/04; before decreasing again to
255,3. This last figure is still 17% higher than in
1994/95. Common robbery increased rapidly from
84,2 per 100,000 in 1994/95, to 223,4 in 2003/04,
before decreasing to 159,4 in 2005/06. This means
that in spite of decreases over the last three years,
common robbery is now 90% higher than 11 years
ago. 
It is fairly certain that robbery (and non-violent
crimes such as theft) will be the biggest crime
threat to visitors and spectators during the 2010
Soccer World Cup. When considering the ability of
the police to safeguard the 2010 event, it may
therefore be useful to briefly compare this event
with previous major events held in South Africa,
with a specific focus on the 2003 ICC Cricket
World Cup. 
Previous ‘big’ events in South Africa
Since the advent of democracy South Africa has
hosted a number of major events, notably the 1995
IRB Rugby World Cup, the 1999 All Africa Games,
the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup and a number of
international conferences such as the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and
the World Conference on Racism (WCR). During
this time the police developed effective security
concepts to underpin their entire big event
planning, and which have proven to be very
successful. No serious incidents occurred at any of
these events. According to SAPS Deputy National
Commissioner André Pruis, these concepts were
recognised by the United Nations (UN) after the
WSSD and adopted for all future UN events. 
A quick comparison between the 2010 Soccer
World Cup (SWC) and the 2003 Cricket World Cup
(CWC) will give an indication of the size of this
type of security operation. Whereas the SWC will
be a month-long event with 64 matches, the CWC
lasted 44 days, with 33 matches. CWC matches
were played in seven provinces, while SWC
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security operation is understood to be built around
the following key areas:
• An integrated operational coordinating 
mechanism. The utilisation of such a mechanism
(or organisational structure) to plan and execute
the security operation is crucial. In this instance
the police are once again the lead agent in the
so-called JOINTS (Joint Operational and
Intelligence Structure) that reports to and is
directed by the JCPS cluster (Justice, Crime
Prevention and Security) at both Cabinet and
Directors-General level. The JOINTS created an
operational planning committee, chaired by a
divisional commissioner, and a priority
committee, chaired by an assistant commissioner,
for the operational work. All the various role-
players, including relevant government
departments such as Sport and Recreation and
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, as well as
SAFA (South African Football Association) and
FIFA, are represented on the planning and priority
committees. 
• An integrated security strategy. This strategy 
details the security for the stadiums, practice
venues, public viewing areas, media centres,
main hotels, public transport, air- and seaports,
main routes and popular tourist attractions. The
strategy also provides for an integrated
intelligence capability, information technology
security, and control of undesirable persons (e.g.
soccer hooligans or ‘risk supporters’), public
order, food security, dedicated courts,
contingency plans and disaster management. In
2004 the FIFA Inspection Group, while
concerned about the crime problem, expressed
their satisfaction with this approach.
• Adequate numbers. The SAPS has ensured that by 
2010 (and in addition to other police and security
services), it will have sufficient member numbers
to both safeguard the event and to provide
‘normal’ policing services. In 2001 the police
numbered approximately 121,000 and in 2006
that figure increased to 156,000. According to the
Annual Report of the South African Police Service
2005/06 the personnel target for 2008/09 is
179,000.        
• A thorough vetting and accreditation process. 
Security companies, for example, will have to be
accredited before being contracted.
• Training. Members of the various security 
services, including police reservists who will be
utilised during the event, will receive special
training and orientation. 
• Practice. Other big events between now and 
2010 will be used to test the above approach and
to make changes where necessary. An example of
such a big event is South Africa’s general election
in 2009. 
• Good media communication. Structures to ensure 
good media and public communication will be in
place well ahead of the event. Apart from
keeping the media informed about security
issues, these structures will also be responsible
for security ‘tips’ to the public (during the 2003
CWC these ‘tips’ were also published in the
Tournament Guide).
• Lessons learnt. Over the years the police have 
sent representatives to attend a number of big
events abroad and to study their security
arrangements. For example, police members
attended the last three Olympic Games and other
big sporting events such as the 2006 FIFA Soccer
World Cup in Germany. From all these events
and local experience they were able to develop
the security concepts that seem to be very
effective locally and also impressed the United
Nations security representatives. According to
Commissioner Mathongwane the following
practices, applied by the Germans during the
2006 World Cup, were of particular interest:
– The use of ‘Fan Fests’. These were stadiums not 
used for any of the matches and where the
organisers provided facilities to show matches
on big screens. People who did not have or
could not afford tickets had free access to these
stadiums. However, the same level of security
that applied at the official venues also applied
at the Fan Fests.
– The ticketing system. Tickets were not only 
electronically monitored, but also personalised.
This had a number of advantages, such as
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keeping the authorities informed of the number
of spectators and also who they were. In
addition it prevented sales of tickets on the
black market.
– The integrated security plan. Some aspects of 
the German security plan were very useful for
purposes of finalising South Africa’s integrated
security strategy.
Policing and security
The current crime situation in South Africa is
certainly a huge area of concern and perhaps also a
source of embarrassment for the South African
government. This is especially the case in view of
the fast approaching Soccer World Cup in 2010 and
our struggle to get the crime situation under control.
It is feared that the ongoing high levels of crime and
violence may deter many people from coming to
South Africa and even, according to some
speculation, that the event itself may be moved
elsewhere. Against this background, government
over the last few months announced a number of
new ‘plans’ to curb crime.
At a press conference on 1 August 2006, Charles
Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, provided
details of the crime combating strategy adopted by
Cabinet at their lekgotla the week before. This
strategy is nothing really new, but does contain
some additions to the existing National Crime
Combating Strategy (NCCS) which was adopted in
2000 and which boasted a number of operational
successes. According to the Minister his office
would approach the Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation to do a study on the
violent nature of crime in South Africa. This is a
welcome admission that a better understanding of
this phenomenon is needed in order to deal with it
more effectively.
The Minister also made it clear that much more
emphasis will be placed on eradicating organised
crime. For this purpose special teams will be
established to deal with crime syndicates while
other teams will be formed to search for and arrest
suspects for whom warrants of arrest are
outstanding. Intelligence units will assist these
teams and will receive additional funding and
human resources. In view of indications of the
increasing involvement of foreigners in crime in
South Africa, the Minister announced stricter border
control measures. For this purpose a national border
control and security strategy had been finalised and
a national border control centre set up. Finally, the
Minister announced closer cooperation with
Business Against Crime and the mobilisation of
communities, through religious groupings and
others, to become more actively involved in the
fight against crime.
However, the large scale restructuring that the SAPS
has embarked upon remains a source of concern.
Although the intentions of this exercise are not
being questioned, its practicability is in doubt. The
intentions are, among others, to move police
officials at various administrative offices to police
stations to numerically strengthen these stations and
to increase police visibility; to decentralise
specialised units to the so-called accounting (or
‘super’) stations where they will be more accessible
to communities; and to transfer high ranking officers
such as directors and assistant commissioners to
‘problem’ stations as station commissioners and to
other key posts.
From discussions with members of the police it is
evident that there is growing dissatisfaction with the
rationale behind the restructuring process. Police
officials are generally confused with the reasoning
behind the process and with the way in which it is
being communicated and implemented. It is to be
expected that this type of dissatisfaction and
uncertainty must have a negative impact on morale.
As a consequence the following questions or
concerns about the restructuring process are raised:
• Is it wise to undertake such a comprehensive 
restructuring so close to the biggest major event
this country has ever seen and amidst an
increasing violent crime situation? Would it not
be more realistic to phase it in more gradually
and over a much longer period? 
• Is it a fair assumption by police management that 
senior officers, who in many cases obtained their
senior rank due to fast track promotions to
enhance transformation, will improve the
management of problematic police stations? 
• Instead of decentralising the specialised units and 
running the risk of these members eventually
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losing their skills or leaving the police (and losing
their skills anyway), why not rather consider
strengthening them and enabling them, firstly, to
retain and continue developing expertise, and
secondly, from a position of strength and
expertise, to assist and train members at police
station level?
• The police/public ratio of 1:385 compares 
favourably with the international average of
1:300–400 and, as indicated above, is set to
improve even more over the next three years. It
appears as if the problem is not so much with the
number of police, but rather with how they are
being managed. This notion is supported by the
recent announcement of the Minister of Safety
and Security that retired police officers will be
approached to assist the police in terms of their
experience and skills. At the same time it is an
acknowledgement that the police lost more
expertise than they could afford. There seems to
be an almost desperate search for alternative ways
to compensate for earlier mistakes, but without
admitting that these were made.
Conclusion
There are legitimate concerns that South Africa may
not be able to provide an adequate level of security
for the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup. These
concerns are based primarily on two premises:
• Firstly, there is general consensus that the high 
levels of crime and especially the extreme nature
of the violence that accompanies these crimes,
create a negative perception about South Africa’s
readiness to host this event. There is a danger that
this may deter people from coming here and
some even speculate that the event may be
moved to another country.
• Secondly, the perceived struggle within the police 
to stem the crime tide and the apparent
clumsiness with which they are attempting to
restructure the organisation to make it more
efficient and effective, leads to serious distrust in
the ability of the police to safeguard the 2010
event.
As regards the first premise, there is an obvious
need for more visible commitment and an
expression of political will by government to
address the crime problem. This should include a
more holistic and inclusive approach to crime, both
in terms of its manifestation and its economic and
socio-political roots. Commitment would also
include the setting up of an extra-cabinet ministerial
committee to manage such an inclusive approach.  
With regard to the second premise, some form of
political intervention is necessary to ensure that the
restructuring of the police is done sensibly and
responsibly. The police have in the past proved
themselves as competent and able to secure major
events. This was the case, for example, in 2003
with the Cricket World Cup, despite the fact that in
general levels of crime were higher then than they
are at the moment. Therefore the current
restructuring process should not be allowed in any
way to impair the ability of the police to perform
according to their proven ability.
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Endnotes 
1 Most of the information for this article can be found 
on the Internet at, for example:
<http://www.southafrica.info/2010/fifareportsa.htm>
2  These figures were taken from the Annual Reports of 
the South African Police Service 2001/02 – 2005/06.
